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CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-CIVIL RIGHTS-COM-CAMUNITY FACILITIES Dis-
CRIMINATION. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 90 S. Ct. 400 (1969).
Paul Sullivan was a member of Little Hunting Park, Inc. which was
organized for the benefit of the residents of his subdivision in Fairfax
County, Virginia. This membership entitled him and his family to
the use of various recreational facilities. Under the bylaws of the cor-
poration, a member was entitled, when he rented his house, to assign
his membership to his tenant, subject to the approval of the board of
directors. Sullivan attempted such an assignment to T. R. Freeman. The
board of directors refused to approve the assignment, however, because
Freeman was a Negro.'
Subsequently, Sullivan was expelled from the corporation after pro-
testing the refusal of the board to accept his assignment. He and Free-
man brought suit seeking an injunction and damages under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.2 The trial court upheld the board's action and the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia refused to review the decision.'
In reversing the trial court's judgment,4 the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that the statutes prohibited the refusal to approve
such an assignment to a Negro.
The post-civil war attack on racial discrimination involved both legis-
1. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 90 S. Ct. 400 (1969).
2. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27,42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964):
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
3. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia did not reach the merits of the dispute
as it refused to hear the appeal because it
'was not perfected in the manner provided by law in that opposing
counsel was not given reasonable written notice of the time and place of
tendering the transcript and a reasonable opportunity to examine the
original or a true copy of it... "
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 209 Va. 279, 280 (1968) quoting from an
unreported 1967 dismissal order.
4. The Supreme Court of the United States, by its order of June 17, 1968, granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia for consideration in light of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968). Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 392 U.S. 657 (1968).
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, upon remand, held that
(oinly this court may say when it does and when it does not have
jurisdiction under its Rules. We had no jurisdiction in the cases when they
were here before, and we have no jurisdiction now. We adhere to our
orders refusing the appeals in these cases.
209 Va. at 281.
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lative5 and constitutional6 approaches. But in the decade following this
period of enactment, a movement of "judicial nullification and legis-
lative repeal" 7 was to culminate in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883.8
The Court, in considering five proceedings involving violations of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875,9 by owners of inns, theaters, and railroads,
concluded that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment' ° permitted
Congress to adopt only laws "correcting the effects" of state actions
violative of the amendment's restrictions." Mr. Justice Bradley, speak-
ing for the majority in declaring the act unconstitutional, stated: "It
is State action of a particular character that is prohibited [by the
fourteenth amendment]. Individual invasion of individual rights is not
the subject matter of the amendment." 12
The state action limitation imposed by the Court became the accepted
test of inter-relationship of the first and fifth sections of the fourteenth
amendment.'3 In addition, the Court was to reflect the limited nature
of the federal protection over private action in Hodges v. United States,4
5. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875); Civil Rights Act of 1870,
ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
6. U.S. CoNsr. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
7. Robison, The Possibility of a Frontal Assault on the State Action Concept, with
Special Reference to the Right to Purchase Real Property Guaranteed in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982, 41 NoiRE DAmE LAWYER 455, 456 (1966). See also R. CAra, FEDERAL PRO(TECnON
oF CiviL RIGHrS: QUas'r FOR A SwoRD (1947).
8. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
9. Ch. 114, 18 Star. 335.
10. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV:
SwmtON 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the' United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
SECnON 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
11. 109 U.S. at 11.
12. Id. Justice Harlan dissented, expressing the view that:
If the constitutional amendments be enforced, according to the intent
with which, as I conceive, they were adopted, there cannot' be, in this
republic, any class of human beings in practical subjection to another
class, with power in the latter to dole out to the former just such privileges
as they may choose to grant.
Id. at 62.
13. Robison, supra note 7 at 457-58.
14. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). The court stated: "[N]o mere
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which held that section two of the 1866 Act was not operative as a
protection against the terrorizing of Negroes who had sought to exer-
cise section one rights under the Act. Instead, the Court emphasized
the limited nature of the protection afforded under the thirteenth amend-
ment; that "only conduct that actually enslaves" was prohibited. 15
This restrictive interpretation was reiterated in Corrigan v. Buckley, 16
where the 1866 Civil Rights Act was not applicable to prevent discrim-
ination in housing by Use of radically restrictive covenants.1
7
In Hurd v. Hodge,'8 the Court interpreted the intent of the act to
prohibit governmental action which deprived Negroes of equal rights
to purchase property. The question of whether the 1866 Act was in-
tended to reach private as well as public discrimination was left unan-
swered until Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.19 twenty years later. There
the Court stated:
We hold that § 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well
as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus
construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce
the Thirteenth Amendment.2 0
In construing the scope of § 1982 in light of the thirteenth amendment,
the Court in Jones affirmed the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, and concluded that the statute protects Negroes from discrim-
ination in the purchase or sale of real property.21 By incorporating
private actions into the federal prohibition against discrimination, the
assault or trespass or appropriation operates to reduce the individual to a condition of
slavery." Id. at 18.
15. Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 VAM. L.
Rav. 485, 498 (1969).
16. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
17. "The Thirteenth Amendment denouncing slavery and involuntary servitude, that
is, a condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another, does not in other
matters protect the individual rights of persons of the negro race." Id. at 330.
18. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). The issue in Hurd was not private action
as in Corrigai, but involved federal action.
19. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
20. Id. at 413.
21. Comment, Racial Discrimination and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 23 Sw. L.J.
373, 380 (1969).
Speaking through Justice Stewart, the majority held that the Act was a
valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the thirteenth amend-
ment and that Congress had intended thereby to prohibit all private as
well as publi& discrimination on the basis of race in the sale or rental of
property.
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Court turned away from legal precedent and emphasized the legislative
history of § 1982.22
In holding that membership in a private social club constituted proper-
ty under the statute, Sullivan has extended the scope of § 1982 beyond
the interpretation rendered in Jones.2 3 Distinctions between real and
personal property in characterizing Sullivan's membership share were,
found immaterial, as § 1982 covers both types of property.24 The re-
fusal to approve assignment of the Corporate share [in Little Hunting
Park] because the assignee was a Negro was interference with the right
to lease; a right that is protected by § 1982.25
Because of the Fair Housing Act of 196828 the judicial soundness of the
Sullivan decision might be questioned.27 This law explicitly prohibits
discrimination "against any person in the terms, conditions, or priv-
ileges of . . . rental [of housing], or in the provisions of services or
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, [or] color .... 28
Clearly, the Court was desirous of adjudicating the petitioner's civil
rights under § 1982, regardless of the Fair Housing Law.2 This spirit
of protection and judicial urgency in the area of civil rights may dis-
perse into other private clubs and organizations where civil rights are
ill-defined, or not protected at all. MICHAEL McH. COLLNS
22. 392 U.S. at 436-37.
23. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 90 S. Ct. 400, 404 (1969).
24. Regarding the scope of § 1982, the court stated:
A narrow construction of the language of § 1982 would be quite in-
consistent with the broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant
to be afforded by 5 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which
§ 1982 was derived.
Id. at 404.
As the dissent pointed out, however, "examination of the opinion . . . show[s] that
the majority . . . failed to explain why the membership . . . [was] either real or
personal property for purposes of § 1982." Id. at 410.
25. Id. at 404.
26. 82 Star. 83, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (Supp. IV 1969).
27. Although it would have not helped the petitioners in the Sullivan case, possibly
the court should have denied certiorari in light of this new law for, the court's
certiorari jurisdiction should not be exercised simply "for the benefit of the particu-
lar litigants." Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955).
Instead, the court's certiorari jurisdiction should perhaps be exercised for the "settle-
ment of [issues] . . . of importance to the public .... " Layne & Bowler Corp. v.
Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923).
28. 82 Stat. 83, 42 U.S.C. S 3604(b) (Supp. IV 1969).
29. In deciding the case, the Court stressed that the Fair Housing Act of 1968 is not
fully effective until December 31, 1969. "So no one knows whether the new Act would
apply to these ancient transactions even if they arose after December 31, 1969." 90 S.
Ct. 406 n.5.
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